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NOTES 
THE UNEXPECTED REGULATOR: 
REGULATION THROUGH SETTLEMENT 
AFTER VIOXX AND BEXTRA 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2003 alone, the prescription pain reliever Vioxx generated $2.5 
billion in sales for its creator Merck.1 It was actively marketed in over 
eighty countries, and had been taken by more than eighty million people 
worldwide.2 By the end of 2004, Vioxx had been pulled off shelves after a 
study revealed that it nearly doubled the rates of heart attacks in longtime 
users.3 Pfizer, with its own chemically similar drug Bextra, soon followed 
suit.4 Subsequently, allegations arose that the two pharmaceutical giants had 
engaged in the inappropriate marketing of unsafe products,5 producing a 
flurry of lawsuits.6 This in turn led two coalitions of state Attorneys General 
(AGs) to file suits against Merck and Pfizer for violations of state consumer 
protection laws.7 The two settlements that resolved these lawsuits not only 
brought the states considerable sums of monetary damages,8 but also 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm. 
 2. Id.; Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health—Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 351;17, 1707 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp048286. 
 3. Merck Withdraws Vioxx; FDA Issues Public Health Advisory, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.–
Dec. 2004, at 11, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1370/is_6_38/ai_n7069493/; 
Richard Knox, Merck Pulls Arthritis Drug Vioxx from Market, NPR (Sept. 30, 2004), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4054991. 
 4. William C. Sheil, Jr., COX-2 Inhibitors Dilemma Vioxx, Celebrex, Bextra What 
Patients Should Do, MEDICINENET.COM (Apr. 7, 2005), http://www.medicinenet.com/script 
/main/art.asp?articlekey=41853. 
 5. See Teresa Curtin & Ellen Relkin, Preamble Preemption and the Challenged Role of 
Failure to Warn and Defective Design Pharmaceutical Cases in Revealing Scientific Fraud, 
Marketing Mischief, and Conflicts of Interest, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1773, 1783 (2007). 
 6. Micah L. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on Public 
Health Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). In 2007, approximately 27,000 lawsuits over deaths 
and injuries caused by Vioxx were settled for $4.85 billion. Alex Berenson, Merck Agrees to 
Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2007/11/09/business/09merck.html. 
 7. Press Release, Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Corbett 
Announces a Multi-State, $58 Million Settlement with Merck over Deceptive Advertising 
Concerning the Safety of Vioxx (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.attorneygeneral 
.gov/press.aspx?id=3660; Press Release, The State of New Jersey, Office of the Attorney General, 
Attorney General Announces $2.1 Million Settlement with Pfizer over Promotion of Celebrex, 
Bextra (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter N.J. Press Release], available at http://www.nj.gov/oag 
/newsreleases08/pr20081022a.html. 
 8. See Stipulated General Judgment at 11, Oregon ex rel. Myers v. Merck & Co. [hereinafter 
Merck Stip. Judgment], available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/ag_document 
.pdf (providing a total award of $58 million to the participating states); Stipulated General 
Judgment at 15, Oregon ex rel. Myers v. Pfizer, Inc. [hereinafter Pfizer Stip. Judgment], available 
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contained potentially momentous substantive terms granting the state AGs 
broad regulatory enforcement power.9 
Over the past fourteen years, the offices of the state AGs have 
demonstrated an increased interest in regulating business through 
litigation.10 Faced with the failure of legislatures and administrative 
agencies to impose sufficient limits on corporate action, AGs have turned to 
litigation as a means of enforcement.11 Through litigation, state AGs may, 
in conjunction with state courts, simultaneously reap sizable monetary 
awards for the state,12 while also creating substantive terms to dictate the 
future behavior of an offending corporation.13 Such terms effectively 
function as a new system of regulation—placing new requirements on 
corporate conduct and giving rise to new causes of action if they are 
violated.14 
Nowhere does this seem more effective, yet disruptive, than in the 
context of the settlement of mass tort claims, where a coalition of state AGs 
may easily have the power to force a lopsided agreement to increase its own 
regulatory powers over corporations.15 While the discretion of whether to 
approve such a settlement ultimately lies with the judge,16 courts may be 
hesitant to interfere with the AGs’ efforts,17 particularly where such an 
agreement will bring tremendous financial benefits to states in need.18 The 
results of such an agreement, however, may disrupt the federal regulatory 
model,19 while simultaneously raising costs for businesses and consumers 
alike.20 Such action therefore raises constitutional concerns with respect to 
the separation of powers doctrine, as state executives are petitioning courts 
for regulatory power that is traditionally granted through legislative 
                                                                                                                 
at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/pdf/pfizer_stip_judg_complaint.pdf (providing a total award 
of $60.1 million to the participating states). 
 9. See Christopher R. Page, Comment, These Statements Have Not Been Approved by the 
FDA: Improving the Postapproval Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 88 OR. L. REV. 1189, 1208 
(2009); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens 
Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 946 (2008). 
 10. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 914. 
 11. Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy 
Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DE PAUL L. REV. 493, 498 (2001). 
 12. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO 
POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 2005). The estimated award going to the forty-six states involved in the 
tobacco settlement totals $246 billion over a twenty-five-year period. Id.  
 13. See, e.g., Page, supra note 9, at 1208–09. 
 14. See, e.g., id.  
 15. See id. at 1201–02.  
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . 
only with the court’s approval.”). 
 17. Gifford, supra note 9, at 945.  
 18. Id.  
 19. See, e.g., id. at 945–46; see generally Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-
Covered Smokers, and the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081 
(2010) (arguing that payments from Big Tobacco litigation violated the Social Security Act). 
 20. See, e.g., Traylor, supra note 19, at 1097; Gifford, supra note 9, at 951. 
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processes.21 Moreover, serious policy issues arise from the increasing 
control of state AGs over businesses.22 
The purpose of this note is to illustrate the need for some limitation on 
state regulation by litigation, as demonstrated by the Vioxx and Bextra 
settlements, while also proposing an alternative that integrates the state AGs 
into the federal regulatory structure. Part I will briefly examine these 
settlements as a logical progression from the AGs’ earlier Tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement. Part II will analyze justiciability concerns in the 
approval of such settlements regarding both horizontal and vertical 
separation of powers. It will conclude with a discussion of recent 
congressional action to explicitly include state AGs within the federal 
regulatory scheme. Part III will explore potential negative policy 
implications of allowing state AGs to bring unchecked suits for the purpose 
of expanding their own regulatory enforcement power. Finally, in Part IV, 
this note concludes that Congress must take action to explicitly define the 
enforcement role of state AGs within controversial areas of the federal 
regulatory scheme. Such an approach, which has already been employed in 
some areas of federal regulation,23 would provide guidance as to both the 
acceptable and unacceptable limits of the state AGs’ regulatory roles, and 
enable an integrated system to reap the benefits of state AGs as regulators, 
while avoiding the potential harms of state overreach. 
I. INCREASING STATE REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE 
VIOXX AND BEXTRA SETTLEMENTS 
The template for state AGs actively pursuing a greater regulatory 
enforcement role grew out of litigation against Big Tobacco in the 1990s.24 
Traditionally, the state AGs have been recognized as the “chief legal 
officers of the states.”25 In the case of the tobacco litigation, however, the 
AGs arguably transcended their role to enact considerable policy reform 
through a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the major cigarette 
manufacturers.26 The AGs gained regulatory power as a result of the 
settlement when, in addition to paying substantial monetary awards,27 the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Gifford, supra note 9, at 946–51. 
 22. Id. at 947. 
 23. Congress has granted state AGs the right to bring suit as parens patriae for violations, 
provided that notice is given to the appropriate regulatory agency. See, e.g., Consumer Product 
Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2008); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1041–1042, 124 Stat. 
1376, 2011–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5551–5552 (2010)).  
 24. See Page, supra note 9, at 1203–04. 
 25. About NAAG Information on the Association, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter About NAAG]. 
 26. DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 1–3. 
 27. Id. at 1. The total estimated award to the states is $246 billion, dispersed from 2008 
through 2025. Id.  
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tobacco companies also agreed to abide by far reaching limitations on how 
their products could be marketed, particularly to children.28 The success of 
the MSA unlocked vast possibilities for the AGs in terms of expanding their 
enforcement and regulatory powers via the substantive terms of a 
settlement.29 Commentators have noted that the substantive terms of the 
settlement effectively created the kinds of regulations for which advocacy 
groups had unsuccessfully lobbied Congress.30 Attempts to enact policy 
change by both traditional legislative and administrative routes had proved 
fruitless when it came to the unusual problem of tobacco.31 In this way, the 
tobacco MSA provided states with a game plan when two of the world’s 
largest pharmaceutical companies, Merck and Pfizer, engaged in illicit “off-
label” marketing of drugs with harmful side effects.32 
A. VIOXX (MERCK) 
In the case of both Vioxx and Bextra, the perceived ineffectiveness33 of 
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) pharmaceutical regulation 
likely encouraged state AGs to pursue the regulatory measures included in 
the corresponding settlements.34 A history of the events leading up to the 
eventual recall of Vioxx illustrates the fact that discontent with the FDA’s 
regulation led other actors to take action.35 In 2001, as Vioxx’s popularity 
was on the rise, the FDA delivered an extensive warning letter to Merck, 
detailing explicit misrepresentations that the company had made as to the 
cardiovascular safety of the drug, while also voicing concerns that the drug 
actually raised the rate of heart attacks.36 After the delivery of the letter, 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, Project Tobacco, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., 
(Nov. 1998), 24–36, http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with 
%20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf/file_view; see also DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
 29. See id. at 2–4; Page, supra note 9, at 1204. 
 30. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 11, at 498; Page, supra note 9, at 1204 (“Antismoking 
advocates had tried for years to obtain similar restraints on the tobacco industry from Congress, to 
no avail, presumably due to lobbying efforts.”). 
 31. Hensler, supra note 11, at 498. A previous settlement agreement, having national effect, 
had been reached by the state AGs in 1997, pending Congress’ approval. The settlement, however, 
included terms that the state AGs recognized might not withstand constitutional scrutiny, and 
required passage by the federal legislative branch. Congress subsequently did not approve the 
settlement, opening the door for the current tobacco MSA. DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 119–29 
(chronicling the opposition to, and ultimate failure of, the 1997 settlement). It is worth noting that 
the proposed 1997 settlement would have imposed greater substantive restrictions on the tobacco 
industry than the 1998 MSA, but these restrictions also involved the FDA as a regulator. Id. at 
176.  
 32. Page, supra note 9, at 1189, 1204–14. 
 33. See, e.g., id.  
 34. Id. at 1207–14; MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, MERCK SETTLES VIOXX LITIGATION WITH 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: AN ANALYSIS 2 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.mwe 
.com/info/news/wp0508a.pdf. 
 35. MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, supra note 34, at 2. 
 36. See FDA Warning Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver., and 
Comm’ns, to Raymond V. Gilmartin, President & CEO, Merck & Co., Inc. (Sept. 17, 2001), 
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however, the FDA considered the matter “satisfactorily resolved.”37 They 
did not require Merck to take any action concerning its misleading press 
release and did not issue further letters alleging the improper marketing of 
Vioxx.38 Nonetheless, significant evidence existed as early as March 2000 
that Vioxx increased, and possibly even doubled, the rate of heart problems 
when compared to other anti-inflammatory drugs.39 Yet, the FDA failed to 
require even a warning about cardiovascular risk to be applied to the 
medication’s label until 2002.40 Meanwhile, the drug remained on the 
market until September 30, 2004.41 
Within the Merck settlement agreement, the AGs attempted to give 
themselves greater power to protect their constituents from agency 
inactivity.42 The result is two distinct groups of terms—some of which 
increased the participating state AGs’ enforcement powers in relation to the 
FDA’s regulatory realm, while others created entirely new demands on 
Merck.43 In the first category, for instance, Merck agreed not to violate the 
terms of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in regard to 
“any written or oral promotional claims of safety or effectiveness.”44 This, 
along with other terms,45 gives the state AGs power to enforce any 
violations of the Merck settlement by means of a contempt proceeding.46 
Merck also agreed to additional restrictions over the future marketing of 
their products,47 including agreeing to delay any proposed Direct to 
Consumer (DTC) marketing plan if the FDA’s Director of the Center for 
Drug Evaluation recommends such a delay, for however long the Director 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation 
/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCom
panies/UCM166383.pdf. 
 37. Report of John S. Martin, Jr. to the Special Comm. of the Bd. of Dirs. of Merck & Co., Inc. 
Concerning the Conduct of Senior Mgmt. in the Dev. and Mktg. of Vioxx, at 96 (Sept. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/001_02_report_of_the_honorable_john 
_s_martin_jr_our_findings.pdf. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Rubin, supra note 1. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Topol, supra note 2, at 1707. 
 42. See Page, supra note 9, at 1208. 
 43. Id. at 1208. 
 44. See Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 5–8. 
Merck shall not make any written or oral promotional claims of safety or effectiveness 
for any FDA-approved Merck Product in a manner that violates the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, . . . accompanying regulations, or voluntary agreements with [the] FDA, 
as interpreted by the FDA in a writing by the Director of the Center for Drug 
Evaluation at the FDA.  
Id. at 5 (internal citation omitted).  
 45. Id. at 5–8. 
 46. Page, supra note 9, at 1209.  
 47. Id. at 1208.  
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recommends.48 Moreover, in paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement, 
Merck agreed to submit any future DTC television advertising directly to 
the FDA for review and approval, and to make any changes that the FDA 
suggests.49 
These provisions expand the regulatory enforcement power of the state 
AGs to areas that have previously only fallen within the purview of the 
FDA.50 The potential implications of these settlements on the federal 
regulatory scheme could be profound, as state AGs gain the de facto ability 
to enforce the FDCA and FDA regulations.51 One commentator on the 
Merck settlement has noted the following: “[T]he fact that State AGs, 
individually and collectively, can now march into court under FDA’s own 
regulations effectively means that there is a ‘new cop on the beat’ ready, 
willing and able to pursue actions for alleged advertising violations 
whenever they believe FDA is not doing the job properly.”52 
At the same time, the creation of brand new requirements for Merck to 
abide by also allows the state AGs to effectively make regulatory decisions 
on the nature of corporate advertising.53 It is debatable whether enhancing 
the state AGs’ powers in this way is valid under the constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine, as it may create a “blank check” for the state 
AGs to intrude upon the federal or legislative realms.54 
B. BEXTRA (PFIZER) 
The downfall of Bextra closely paralleled that of Vioxx. Bextra was 
designed to reduce the risk of illness associated with traditional anti-
inflammatory drugs; yet, there was no evidence that it was successful as 
compared to traditional methods.55 Nevertheless, they marketed the drugs as 
safer alternatives to other anti-inflammatories, such as Advil and Aleve.56 
When thirty-three states and the District of Columbia launched their 2003 
investigation into whether Pfizer had violated state consumer protection 
laws,57 concerns arose regarding the AGs’ case. The AGs concluded that 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 6. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Jennifer Wolsing, Vioxx Settlement: State AGs’ New Rights to Enforce Food & Drug Law, 
THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW AND PUB. POL’Y STUDIES (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.fed 
-soc.org/publications/pubID.1148/pub_detail.asp. 
 51. Id.; Page, supra note 9, at 1208–09.  
 52. MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, supra note 34, at 5. See also Page, supra note 9, at 1213. 
 53. See Page, supra note 9, at 1209. Page notes that certain terms requiring submission of 
advertising to agencies may also give rise to a constitutionality issue under the First Amendment. 
See id. This issue is not dealt with here. See also MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, supra note 34, at 
4. 
 54. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 951. 
 55. N.J. Press Release, supra note 7.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.; Page, supra note 9, at 1212. Oregon led the litigation. Other states joining the litigation 
included: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
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Pfizer had actively marketed Bextra for off-label uses that had been 
explicitly rejected by the FDA by means of “an aggressive, deceptive and 
unlawful campaign.”58 These concerns may have contributed to additional 
provisions within the settlement, increasing the state AGs’ oversight 
authority over Pfizer. 
While both settlements provide for similar expansions of state 
enforcement authority into the federal regulatory realm,59 the terms of the 
Pfizer settlement further expands the state AGs’ role in regulation.60 While 
both the Merck and Pfizer settlements contain a provision requiring that any 
future DTC television campaign be submitted to the FDA,61 the Pfizer 
settlement provides that, in the event the FDA does not respond within 
forty-five days, Pfizer may run the advertisement after contacting a 
“Multistate Executive Committee” of AGs.62 The company must, however, 
provide written notice that the FDA has not given Pfizer feedback on its 
proposed advertising and submit all materials delivered to the FDA directly 
to the Multistate Executive Committee.63 Note that this may have actually 
been preferable for Pfizer, as Merck’s settlement required the company to 
wait until it had received word from the FDA regardless of how much time 
passed.64 One commentator has suggested that this variation suggests that 
the state AGs realized they lacked the means to ensure the actual 
enforcement of the terms of the settlement.65 Here then, it seems that the 
                                                                                                                 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the 
District of Columbia. Id. 
 58. Id. A regional manager who played a major part in promoting Bextra’s off-label marketing 
stated in court that off-label marketing was part of Pfizer’s corporate culture, and that her own 
success in illicitly promoting Bextra was described as “awesome” by company medical directors. 
Jim Edwards, Pfizer Exec: Company Approved of Off-Label Bextra Promotion, BNET.COM, 
http://www.bnet.com/blog/drug-business/pfizer-exec-company-approved-of-off-label-bextra-
promotion/1934. 
 59. See Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 5; Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 5.  
 60. Page, supra note 9, at 1212–13 (describing terms in the Pfizer settlement not found in the 
Merck settlement, including self-reporting). 
 61. See, e.g., Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 6; Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 
6. 
 62. See Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 2, 6. 
 63. See id.  
 
. . . Pfizer shall provide written notice to the Multistate Executive Committee that 
Pfizer is running the advertisement and that the FDA has not provided Pfizer with 
a pre-review response addressing the substance of the advertising . . . and also 
provide a copy of all material submitted to FDA for the review of the subject 
advertisement. . . .  
Id.  
 64. Page, supra note 9, at 1212–13; Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 6. 
 65. Page, supra note 9, at 1212–13 (“The states added an interesting twist to the new 
settlement’s terms that seemed to address a perceived difficulty with enforcing the Merck 
settlement.”); Merck Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 6.  
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state AGs preferred to take some oversight into their own hands rather than 
rely on the FDA to render accurate judgments.66 
Moreover, the settlement imposes additional requirements not found in 
the Merck settlement.67 In total, the Pfizer settlement contains 
approximately four additional pages of terms, which predominantly address 
Pfizer’s well publicized off-label marketing.68 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATORY 
SETTLEMENTS 
This part analyzes potential constitutional issues arising out of the 
approval of regulatory settlements. The first section examines the horizontal 
separation of powers issue, arguing that the approval of a regulatory 
settlement inappropriately eschews the legislative branch. The second 
section looks at recent developments in the vertical separation of powers 
and attempts to demonstrate both how they shaped the Vioxx and Bextra 
settlements and how they might affect regulatory settlements in the future. 
Though these issues may seem like two sides of the same coin, the 
preemption doctrine has been significantly litigated in recent years in a way 
that the political question doctrine has not. Nonetheless, both are essential 
to an understanding of the issues raised by regulatory settlements. 
A. HORIZONTAL SEPARATION OF POWERS 
1. Horizontal Separation of Powers: The Political Question 
Doctrine 
When a state AG asks a court for the kinds of relief sought within the 
Vioxx and Bextra settlements, the question arises as to whether the court 
actually has the power under the Constitution to grant such relief.69 This 
issue surfaces because a court’s power to grant relief is necessarily limited 
when a party seeks the court’s intervention in a matter that falls within the 
purview of the legislative or executive branches of government.70 In Baker 
v. Carr, Justice Brennan recognized the inherent difficulty of creating a 
strict test for these “nonjusticiable political question[s].”71 He describes six 
factors that a court should look for when ascertaining whether such a 
question exists: 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., Pfizer Stip. Judgment, supra note 8, at 13. “Pfizer shall not disseminate samples 
of a Product with the intent of increasing Off-label prescribing of the Product.” Id. “Pfizer shall 
not award prizes or other incentives to its sales force as rewards for specifically increasing the 
Off-Label use of a Product.” Id. at 11.  
 68. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.  
 69. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 946–48. 
 70. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (16th ed. 
2007) (discussing the origins and role of doctrine as a limitation on courts’ power). 
 71. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.72 
The “inextricable” presence of any one of these factors would make it 
inappropriate for a court to allow such matter to proceed.73 The rationale for 
this includes the fact that the “coordinate elected branches” of the 
government would be better equipped to reach a proper decision than 
federal judges and would also be held responsible by their electorate for the 
outcome of such a decision.74 
In the context of regulatory litigation, the political question doctrine 
establishes implicit limits on the degree to which a court may grant 
nonmonetary relief.75 To wit, a vast scheme of substantive relief, imposed 
by the court, may result in the creation of a de facto regulatory scheme 
traditionally left to legislative or administrative offices.76 For instance, some 
courts have found that state litigation against major polluters, intended to 
reduce global warming, raised serious nonjusticiable political questions.77 
Such findings were not universal;78 yet, where they did occur, the courts 
have consistently demonstrated concern over making detailed policy 
judgments that could have vast implications for the U.S. economy.79 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 217.  
 73. Id.  
 74. James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 127–28, http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part 
/supreme-court/aep-v.-connecticut-and-the-future-of-the-political-question-doctrine/. 
 75. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 949–50.  
 76. See id. at 950 (discussing the Rhode Island Nuisance Abatement Plan).  
 77. Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVT’L. L. 79, 80–81 (2008); Gifford, supra note 9, at 944. These 
suits arose when, in an effort to regulate global warming, some state AGs attempted to use 
common law public nuisance suits as a means of regulating major polluters. Id. at 948–49. The 
political question doctrine has also been invoked in other recent disputes, including a claim 
against the federal government for the destruction of a Sudanese factory thought to have terrorist 
ties. D.C. Circuit Rejects Claim for Sudanese Bombing as Political Question, CONSTITUTIONAL L. 
PROF. BLOG (June 16, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/06/dc-circuit-rejects 
-claim-for-sudanese-bombing-as-political-question.html. 
 78. See Thorpe, supra note 77, at 83; Gifford, supra note 9, at 948–49.  
 79. See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11, 19, Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 
2d 863, 876–77 (N.D. Cal. 2009). See also Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Thorpe, supra 
note 77, at 84 (describing Judge Senter’s reasoning in Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.). Courts 
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Notably, the Supreme Court recently heard one such global warming case, 
where the political question controversy was discussed at length by the 
lower courts but was unaddressed in the Court’s opinion.80 The Court 
resolved the dispute, instead, by finding that the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s role and Congress’ choice to pass the Clean Air Act prevented 
state AGs from bringing a federal tort claim.81  
The scope of relief granted through the Vioxx and Bextra settlements 
may similarly implicate the factors discussed in Baker, particularly the first 
three. The de facto power of state AGs to enforce elements of federal law, 
for example, likely implicates the first factor because it is a power that has 
previously been limited by Congress to the FDA.82 Likewise, virtually any 
of the substantive terms constitutes a potential “initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,”83 given that the regulatory 
scheme created upon approval of one of the settlements discussed above 
constitute a use of power explicitly granted to “Congress, the state 
legislature, or federal agencies.”84 For instance, if a federal agency is to 
enact official and enforceable regulatory rules, it must go through a detailed 
process of evaluating the effectiveness of its proposed rules, which includes 
weighing alternatives and considering policy interests.85 In the context of 
the substantive terms promulgated by regulatory settlements such as the 
Vioxx and Bextra settlements, however, there is no evidence that such 
procedures were followed.86 
Nevertheless, many settlements that, in practice, serve to regulate major 
manufacturers or industries have been approved in recent years and have 
avoided constitutional scrutiny. For example, a settlement over racially 
discriminatory pricing within the insurance industry did not discuss 
constitutional concerns.87 Additionally, the aforementioned tobacco MSA 
similarly avoided the constitutional inquiry.88 
                                                                                                                 
have also considered that legislation dealing with the issues for which redress was sought was, at 
the time of proceedings, under review by state legislatures. See id. at 80–81. But see In re Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 64, 69, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding no political question issues raised by certain products liability cases brought by private 
parties). 
 80. May, supra note 74, at 129–30. 
 81. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., No. 10-174, slip op. 1, 10 (U.S. June 20, 2011). 
 82. Wolsing, supra note 50; MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, supra note 34, at 3, 5. 
 83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 198, 217 (1962). 
 84. Gifford, supra note 9, at 913. 
 85. W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS 217 (University of Chicago Press 2002). 
 86. Id.  
 87. See, e.g., Multi-State Regulatory Settlement Agreement, Wash. State Office of Ins. 
Comm’r, Order D04-188 (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/oicfiles 
/orders/2004orders/d04-188.pdf (settling claims that insurance companies sold policies at higher 
premiums based on race).  
 88. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, Project Tobacco, supra note 28, at 18–23. 
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Though the Tobacco defendants raised the political question doctrine at 
least once during litigation,89 the MSA has not been overturned on those (or 
any) grounds.90 Yet, courts involved in the litigation have received criticism 
for their role in approving the MSA with what appeared to be minimal 
scrutiny of the relief awarded.91 Martha Derthick, a scholar who has written 
at length on American governance and policymaking, states: 
A judicial check was . . . largely evaded. Courts were arenas of the fight 
but rendered few decisions. Courts might have declined to accept the cases 
on the ground that the issues were political in nature and more 
appropriately left to legislatures. Recall that the industry tried to make that 
argument in Mississippi but was rebuffed by Chancellor [William] Myers. 
The judiciary, which often sits in judgment on what other branches do, 
here would be the primary arena of decision.92 
As a result, the lack of judicial oversight suggests a potential “rubber 
stamp” by the judiciary in the face of legitimate constitutional objections.93 
Perhaps, as has been suggested by many, the states and the tobacco 
companies had reached a stalemate in a conflict for which both sides needed 
resolution.94 Yet, the judiciary’s failure to act suggests that courts may be 
willing to take a passive role in regulatory litigation implicating both large 
damage awards and potentially transformative effects on industry.95 
This passivity implicates practical issues that arise when litigation seeks 
relief for a broad scope of injuries. One tort scholar has argued that the 
remedies pursued by state AGs inherently ask more from the judiciary than 
the branch is entitled to give.96 Yet, few such cases receive adequate 
consideration,97 and fewer may even be dismissed.98 Even when they do, as 
                                                                                                                 
 89. DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 77.  
 90. Id. at 77, 234. 
 91. Id. at 234.  
 92. Id. Chancellor William Myers rejected the tobacco companies’ political question 
arguments in 1995, providing no rationale for his decision. Id. at 77. 
 93. Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 187, 198–99 (2000). 
 94. DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 223; Berman, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
 95. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 944–45. 
 96. Id. at 949–50 (discussing the regulatory scheme granted by a district court in lead paint 
litigation). Gifford writes,  
The question is whether this can be accomplished by a court or whether, instead, such a 
public health situation requires a response from the legislature and appropriate 
administrative officers. In short, the myriad of policy decisions necessary to remediate 
lead-based paint hazards throughout the state may be at the core of the issues that the 
U.S. Supreme Court regards as political questions. 
Id. at 950. 
 97. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 12, at 77 (discussing that Chancellor William Myers 
rejected the tobacco companies’ political question claims without explanation). 
 98. See Gifford, supra note 9, at 944–45. 
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the global climate change litigation illustrates, the results are controversial 
and inconsistent.99 
This indicates that some judges may be inclined to allow state AGs 
greater leeway in prominent suits, refusing to dismiss these broad claims 
even for valid reasons.100 This behavior may stem from the fact that these 
suits represent vast potential awards to impecunious state governments and 
citizens that may have a genuine need for such funds.101 The practical 
effect, however, is a failure in the traditional judicial review process that 
may very well allow state executives to impose intense pressure upon 
commercial ventures.102 
2. An Additional Note on Tobacco and Horizontal Separation 
of Power 
While not strictly implicating the political question doctrine, review of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation is necessary when considering the relation of the court system 
to the other branches of government in the context of regulatory settlement. 
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (decided after the MSA’s 
adoption), the Supreme Court held that efforts undertaken by the FDA to 
regulate the tobacco industry were precluded since Congress had already 
undertaken considerable legislation to regulate tobacco.103 Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority, stated that “[the FDA’s attempt to 
exert] authority is inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed 
in the FDCA’s overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific 
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA.”104 
Given this ruling, it is curious that no party has questioned why those 
same statutes cited in the Court’s ruling in Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation—some of which date back to 1965—should not also preclude 
the judiciary from approving the regulatory terms within the tobacco MSA, 
or currently preclude state AG enforcement of such terms. If the scope of 
tobacco regulation has already been strictly delineated by Congress, then 
the MSA’s continued existence is questionable. This rationale might be 
extrapolated to the state AGs dealing with pharmaceutical companies, as 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See id., at 948–49 (noting some courts’ hesitation to approach the policy interests at play in 
these cases); Thorpe, supra note 77, at 81–84 (contrasting some courts’ findings that the political 
question doctrine is decisive in these cases with others that decline to even mention it). 
 100. Gifford, supra note 9, at 944–45. 
 101. Id.  
 102. See id.  
 103. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). 
 104. Id.  
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Congress has clearly passed legislation granting broad power to the FDA 
over prescription drug marketing.105 
B. VERTICAL SEPARATION OF POWERS: PREEMPTION AND WYETH 
V. LEVINE 
A vertical separation of powers problem arises when a state’s proposed 
action would enable the state to occupy an area reserved by Congress for a 
federal actor.106 When such a conflict occurs, the federal government must 
be able to prevent the state from exercising power over that area.107 Early in 
its history, the Supreme Court found that the Constitution established that 
federal law, in order to maintain a stable union, must be able to preempt 
state actions that conflicted with goals of Congress.108 In Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission, the Court expanded on this doctrine: “[w]hen the Federal 
Government completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of 
it . . . the test of pre-emption is whether ‘the matter on which the State 
asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.’”109 
Practically speaking, however, it has become increasingly difficult to 
identify which fields the federal government has intended to occupy, and to 
what degree.110 As federal government has expanded into areas of state 
welfare,111 and perceived federal agency inaction has drawn the ire of state 
officials,112 fierce battles have been waged over how much state action is 
precluded by the language of congressional statutes.113 
The conflict over preemption grew particularly divisive during the 
presidency of George W. Bush, whose administration pushed the doctrine 
as a means of limiting tort liability, particularly in the area of 
pharmaceutical litigation.114 Though this had previously been an area in 
which state consumer protection law and the FDA worked in concert,115 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See generally Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 
(1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (amending the FDCA to preserve 
the integrity of drug marketing).  
 106. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 229–30. 
 107. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). 
 108. See id.; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 229–30. 
 109. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
212–13 (1983) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)). 
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 112. Id. at 2131–41. See also Page, supra note 9, at 1190–93 (describing the FDA’s difficulties 
with post-approval drug regulation). 
 113. Coveny & Sanford, supra note 110, at 269–70. 
 114. Id. at 398.  
 115. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574–77 (2009); Coveny & Sanford, supra note 110, at 
378–79. 
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numerous conflicts arose over whether suits brought under existing state 
consumer protection laws would be preempted.116 This in turn produced a 
string of recent decisions that have greatly expanded the range and limits of 
the preemption doctrine in regard to administrative agencies.117 At least one 
legal scholar has described this line of cases as having “crested (at least for 
now)” in favor of the preemption doctrine with Riegel v. Medtronic, before 
ebbing back in favor of the states with Wyeth v. Levine.118 While there is no 
way of knowing whether such cases actually influenced the Vioxx and 
Bextra settlements, it seems likely that similar cases and settlements will 
raise preemption issues by virtue of the states’ interaction with federal law. 
1. Riegel v. Medtronic 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court designated certain state tort 
actions as incompatible with the explicit wording of federal law.119 In this 
case, the plaintiff sought damages under New York tort law for injuries 
caused by a defective angioplasty balloon.120 Yet, the majority found that 
Congress had manifested the clear intent to eliminate state causes of action 
through the language of a medical devices amendment to the FDCA.121 
Justice Scalia framed the case by first analyzing whether the federal 
government’s statutes placed clear requirements on the device at issue in 
Medtronic,122 and then by examining the statute under which the plaintiff 
brought suit.123 Scalia questioned whether the plaintiff’s claims allowed the 
state to place a requirement on the manufacturer that was “different from, or 
in addition to” the requirements of federal law.124 By answering both these 
questions in the affirmative,125 the Court found that holding Medtronic 
liable for breaches of state law would effectively require the company to 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Coveny & Sanford, supra note 110, at 398–99; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Preemption’s Rise 
(and Bit of a Fall) as Products Liability Reform: Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and the Restatement 
(Third)’s Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 729 (2009). 
 117. Coveny & Sanford, supra note 110, at 398; Cupp, supra note 116, at 729. 
 118. Cupp, supra note 116, at 728. 
 119. Id. at 740–41. 
 120. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008). 
 121. Id. at 316. The relevant statute reads: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of 
a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human 
use any requirement– (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable 
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21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 122. Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 321.  
 123. Id. at 323.  
 124. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
 125. Id. at 312.  
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comply with state regulations, in addition to those imposed by federal 
law.126 
2. Wyeth v. Levine 
By contrast, the Court in Wyeth v. Levine established that federal drug 
regulations create a federal “floor” of regulation,127 but do not preempt the 
enactment of more stringent requirements by state tort law or other 
means.128 This case arose from a doctor’s injection of Wyeth’s drug, 
Phenergan, directly into a patient’s vein, subsequently requiring the 
patient’s arm to be amputated.129 Although the drug warned against such 
practice, the plaintiff’s counsel argued that the company should have 
featured a different kind of warning label explicitly stating that the drug 
should not be administered by this method.130 This in turn triggered 
preemption concerns, as Wyeth argued that allowing the plaintiff’s claims 
to proceed presented an unacceptable conflict with Congress’ implied intent 
as manifested in the federal food and drug laws.131 In support of this idea, 
Wyeth argued that the preamble to the FDCA (added by the FDA in 
2006)132 placed full discretion for the revision of drug labels solely within 
the FDA’s purview.133 
The press called Wyeth the “highest profile” and “most important 
business case of the term,”134 and there was the perception that the Court 
would find in favor of Wyeth and a broad preemption scheme.135 An 
outcome in favor of the drug manufacturers could have had the effect of 
negating almost all failure to warn claims, at least within the pharmaceutical 
industry.136 Yet, the Court ultimately declined to accept the implicit 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. at 328–30.  
 127. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577–78, 581 (2009). 
 128. Id. at 578, 581.  
 129. Id. at 559.  
 130. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 183 n.1 (Vt. 2006). 
 131. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573. The FDCA does not contain an explicit preemption notice; any 
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 134. Michael Doyle, Supreme Court Appears Poised to Side with Drugmakers, CHRON.COM 
(Nov. 3, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6092924.html; Adam 
Liptak, Drug Label, Maimed Patient and Crucial Test for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at 
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 135. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 134. 
 136. Coveny & Sanford, supra note 110, at 383; Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
The Upcoming Supreme Court Case of Wyeth v. Levine and the Preemption Temptation: Part 
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preemption theory proposed by both the pharmaceutical companies and the 
FDA.137 
The majority instead endorsed a more cooperative view of state and 
federal regulations, establishing that federal regulations generally establish 
a baseline without limiting regulations imposed by more demanding state 
laws.138 In regard to the FDCA’s 2006 preamble, the Court was 
unconvinced that an agency’s “mere assertion that state law is an 
obstacle”139 justified the kind of broad preemption sought.140 Pointing to a 
long-standing presumption against preemption, the Court reiterated that the 
“powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”141 Here, Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, argued that it was not clear that such a 
purpose existed.142 Indeed, the Court noted that, prior to the plaintiff’s 
lawsuit, the FDA itself had actually appeared to be generally in favor of the 
“floor, not a ceiling”143 approach, under which a state had the discretion to 
establish stricter regulatory laws if it so chose.144 Moreover, Wyeth failed to 
convince the Court that any sufficient conflict existed that would make it 
impossible for the company to meet the standards of both federal and state 
law.145 Wyeth, therefore, stands for the proposition that even areas which 
have long been the domain of the federal government do not per se preempt 
state action.146 
Yet, Justice Breyer’s concurrence and Justice Alito’s dissent raised 
concerns over what might happen if state action interferes with the FDA’s 
regulatory goals.147 Breyer felt the need to emphasize that the instant case 
did not preclude administrative agency regulations “bearing the force of 
law”148 from maintaining preemptive effect.149 To this end, he suggested 
that there might sometimes be a need to preempt state regulations that 
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 137. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581. 
 138. Id. at 577–78, 581.  
 139. Id. at 576.  
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 141. Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 142. Id. at 581.  
 143. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563 (quoting Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A, 2d 179, 185 (Vt. 2006)).  
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 145. Id. at 581.  
 146. Id. at 581; Dan Schweitzer, The Presumption Against Preemption Strikes Back: The 
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sons-of-altria-group-v.-good-and-wyeth-v.-levine.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).  
 147. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 605–06 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting the majority at 580) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 149. Id. at 581–82.  
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generate either excessive interference with the FDA’s activities or excessive 
costs that would make the product inaccessible to people in need.150 Alito 
argued more vigorously that the FDA’s regulatory efforts over the years 
sufficed to preempt the action of the state,151 and that a state jury judging a 
tort suit would hardly be able to make the same kinds of measured 
judgments that were demanded of the FDA.152 
3. Application of the Modern Preemption Doctrine to 
Regulatory Settlements 
Within the context of regulatory settlements, the preemption doctrine 
places at least some limitations on the substantive relief that a state can ask 
for and enforce. Given Medtronic, for instance, a settlement that attempted 
to regulate the marketing of certain medical devices governed by the 
explicit preemption statute would be unenforceable.153 
Yet, because the Court explicitly rejected the FDA’s argument that the 
FDCA presents both a “floor and a ceiling” for possible regulation,154 it is 
harder to argue that the Vioxx and Bextra settlements are themselves 
preempted by federal regulatory law. As previously discussed, no explicit 
preemption clause exists within the FDCA,155 meaning that Medtronic 
likely would not apply. Moreover, the Court’s recent ruling in Cuomo v. 
Clearinghouse, granting considerable discretion to state law actions, makes 
an implied preemption claim more difficult.156 With regard to Vioxx and 
Bextra, while the settlements were approved in federal court and take power 
from (secondarily) enforcing federal terms, they derive directly from state 
consumer protection law.157 Since Cuomo affirms the state AG’s right to 
pursue enforcement of such laws,158 it would be difficult to make a 
preemption case on these facts. 
Moreover, one commentator has noted that the terms of the AGs’ 
settlements make clear efforts to avoid falling into the preemption trap.159 
This is evident by the fact that the terms of both settlements explicitly state 
that the settlement agreements are not intended to conflict with action that 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 582.  
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 152. Id. at 626.  
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was either requested or prohibited by the FDA or the terms of the FDCA.160 
This implies that, should a conflict arise with a federal statute or long-
standing FDA rule, the settlement would defer to the federal law.161 Wyeth 
and Cuomo, however, would seem to grant the state considerable discretion 
in the absence of an explicit statement to the contrary.  
Nonetheless, this is not to say that the possibility of preemption can be 
ruled out,162 or that even a slight increase in the scope of settlement terms 
would create an unacceptable state-federal conflict.163 As noted, both 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence and Justice Alito’s dissent in Wyeth made a 
point of indicating that there must still be limits to the realm of state 
action.164 Even the majority opinion in Wyeth hinges much of its rejection 
of the preemption theory on the fact that state tort suits will do more good 
than harm to the federal regulatory scheme.165 An actual demonstration to 
the contrary—that the results of litigation significantly interfere with the 
work of a federal agency, significantly raise costs of essential items for state 
citizens, or otherwise infringe upon a federal regulatory statute—might well 
be enough to preempt a regulatory settlement. 
It also bears noting that, when reports of injuries caused by Vioxx and 
Bextra first surfaced, it was unclear whether state tort suits would be wholly 
preempted given the involvement of the FDA.166 The feeling existed, 
particularly given the atmosphere before Wyeth, that the agency would 
attempt to “backdoor” preemption as a means of curtailing excessive tort 
liability.167 This, of course, ultimately proved to be a nonissue.168 In today’s 
environment, however, where concern over corporate ties to the FDA seems 
to have lessened,169 the courts might be more inclined than they were in 
Wyeth to grant an agency request to preempt state regulatory action. 
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C. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO STATE AGS BY EXPLICIT 
GRANT 
It is significant that in the wake of the intense conflict over preemption, 
Congress has actively sought to increase the role of the state AGs in the 
enforcement of federal law.170 This appears to be a growing trend, and 
includes passing explicit grants of enforcement authority within new 
statutes,171 amendments to existing statutes,172 and proposed or pending 
legislation.173 This authority has enabled state AGs to act as a layer of 
oversight at the federal level into a diverse array of areas, including 
enforcement of consumer protection, banking, and telemarketing laws.174 
Such explicit grants, however, allow the legislature to eschew the 
preemption debate by delineating clear cases where they wish to extend the 
power of the state AGs. By the same token, it is important to note that even 
these explicit causes of action contain significant limitations—primarily a 
notification requirement that state AGs alert the agency whose duty it 
typically is to enforce the federal statute the AG is considering acting 
under—and give the agency the opportunity to take over the action.175 
One worthwhile question might be whether the increased use of 
congressional enforcement grants to the state AGs might preempt this kind 
of action. The argument would hinge on demonstrating a clear 
congressional preference for areas of federal litigation in which the state 
AGs are allowed to enforce federal law and areas where they are not. Such 
claims have not been litigated, however, and such an argument might 
require a broad and intensive analysis, not just of the statutes themselves, 
but of its relation to the federal regulatory scheme as a whole. 
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III. POLICY ISSUES WITH EMPOWERING STATE AGS WITH 
BROAD REGULATORY POWERS THROUGH SETTLEMENT 
Even assuming that these kinds of settlements hold up to judicial 
scrutiny, the methods by which they are obtained, as well as the potential 
causes of action they give rise to, raise substantial policy issues. One such 
issue that may arise in any tort litigation by the states is one of disparate 
bargaining power within negotiations, which may in turn produce an unfair 
settlement.176 Another issue is the political nature of state executives, which 
may spark the targeting of businesses based on visibility and the probability 
of a high payout rather than blameworthiness.177 Finally, the contingency 
fee relationships formed by state AGs with private counsel in the course of 
litigation creates the possibility of private parties taking inappropriate 
control over the shape of public policy.178 
A. COERCION 
Litigation against a business creates a “nuisance value” that goes 
beyond the merits of a claim to the actual and potential costs of litigating a 
claim.179 The business must therefore carefully weigh the costs of litigation 
against the possible risk-reward of proceeding with such a claim.180 The 
magnitude of such risks increases in a class action tort suit.181 In a products 
liability case, particularly where a substantial number of people have 
suffered harm, a manufacturer who elects to go to trial may very well hinge 
the future of the company on the decision of an unpredictable jury.182 In 
instances of multistate litigation, an unfavorable verdict could result in the 
company being held liable for the injuries of millions of state citizens.183 
Moreover, such a result would inevitably lead to a slew of private plaintiffs’ 
suits that may well bury the company in expenses.184 Unsurprisingly, such 
calculations often require the prudent company seeking to meet its duty of 
care to settle rather than face such risks.185 
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There is also an additional risk of damage done to the corporation 
through the court of public opinion.186 Whether the everyday person will 
assign fault against a large corporation in favor of sympathetic clients, or 
whether the public will come to believe that individuals’ injuries were the 
product of their own choices, is largely a matter of public relations.187 Yet, 
corporate counsel’s natural desire to control as much information as 
possible in the face of litigation may simultaneously impede public 
relations personnels’ ability to do their jobs.188 Merck, for its part, appears 
to have acted proactively in minimizing public opinion damage during its 
litigations over Vioxx.189 Part of this strategy has involved fully litigating 
certain cases initiated before the settlement was reached, with considerable 
success.190 Two such cases commenced by individual state AGs ended in 
resounding victories for Merck.191 
Particularly within the pharmaceutical context, however, the risk of 
state settlement coercion cannot be overstated. The reason for this is that a 
pharmaceutical company’s existence depends on continuing to receive 
payments from the federal healthcare system.192 In 1998, the Department of 
Health and Human Services revised a rule to expand the authority of its 
Office of Inspector General to exclude pharmaceutical companies that have 
engaged in deceptive practices from the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.193 Given the vast percentage of revenue that pharmaceutical 
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companies derive from these federal programs, this rule virtually precludes 
a pharmaceutical company from taking the risk of setting foot into court in 
any case against the government.194 If the offending company is willing to 
enter into a settlement, however, then that company “can reasonably expect 
that the [Office of Inspector General] will not exercise its discretion to 
exclude the company from continuing to receive federal reimbursement 
funds; [by contrast,] companies that challenge the government’s allegations 
in court clearly put the company at risk of extinction . . . .”195 For Merck or 
Pfizer to be cut off from receiving payments from the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs would likely mean their end.196 Therefore, such a rule 
completely undermines any bargaining power that a company might have 
when trying to reach a settlement with state AGs. Moreover, it seems 
possible that new causes of action that follow from the settlement may 
create a circular effect, allowing the state AG to petition the court for more 
substantive terms to ensure enforcement of the existing settlements. 
B. POLITICALLY TINGED LITIGATION 
Critics of increasing state AGs’ regulatory enforcement power often 
suggest that such grants lead to selective and politically biased litigation 
against corporations.197 The position of a state AG remains, in virtually all 
states, a political one.198 The nature of the position also guarantees that the 
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state AG essentially has exclusive say on whether to sue a particular 
company on behalf of the citizenry.199 Commentators have noted that this 
may lead some state AGs to pursue high profile and politically appealing 
cases for the sake of public appearances and future political gain rather than 
public welfare.200 At the same time, this unilateral disparity in prosecution 
may vastly shape a state’s economic outlook by targeting and imposing new 
burdens on some industries and manufacturers but not others.201 
C. THE IMPROPRIETY OF INVOLVING OUTSIDE COUNSEL WITH 
STATE LITIGATION 
Critics also argue that increased enforcement authority will allow the 
plaintiffs’ bar to both inappropriately profit from and influence state 
litigation via contingency fee arrangements with state offices.202 Such 
arrangements stipulate that private attorneys will work in conjunction with 
the state for no charge unless the litigation proves successful.203 In the event 
of a monetary award, however, the private counsel receives a predetermined 
percentage of that award.204 It is generally accepted that, without such 
contractual arrangements, the state AGs’ offices would generally be unable 
to litigate against private corporate defendants with any great success.205 
Yet, the process by which such attorneys are chosen may be quite lax, 
particularly when weighed against the potential value of fees at stake.206 In 
some cases, little to no formal bidding process may occur.207 Regardless of 
any process, it also appears that political allies or confidants of the state AG 
often end up winning the contract.208 This most famously appeared as an 
issue in the states’ tobacco litigation,209 where around one hundred firms 
had primarily worked on a contingency fee basis for rates that came to as 
much as 33 percent of the eventual award.210 Most of these firms would 
reap awards in the millions of dollars,211 and a select few would even 
exceed the billion-dollar mark.212 Recognizing that their constituents and 
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legislature might object to such astronomical numbers, which would 
eventually be paid by the consumer,213 the state AGs required the tobacco 
companies to settle the attorney’s fees themselves through either arbitration 
or direct agreements with the firms.214 The end result was that no reliable 
information was ever obtained that would enable calculation of a reliable 
total for fees,215 yet some announcements led to harsh criticism from 
professionals who felt that the figures and contract terms constituted 
violations of legal ethics.216 
The more disturbing issue developing from these contracts is the degree 
to which the state officials’ decision to litigate may be influenced by their 
relationships with these private attorneys.217 One commentator writes that 
“private plaintiff’s firms routinely . . . lobby state attorneys general and 
urge them to litigate against one industry or another.”218 This was a facet of 
the tobacco litigation, where AGs “often” brought in private counsel that 
had been politically supportive in the past.219 Such reports reinforce the fear 
that expanding the ability to bring suit against a given corporation will open 
up litigation based on local politics and the appealing target of a fat wallet 
rather than actual blameworthiness.220 
D. COSTS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TOBACCO AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION 
Fundamentally, it is undeniable that the proliferation of regulatory 
settlements grants power to the state AGs to change how companies do 
business.221 Certainly, executively constructed regulation places the targeted 
company at a competitive disadvantage. The ultimate cost to corporations 
of such regulation, broadly applied, will likely be virtually impossible to 
quantify, just as it is within the larger federal scheme.222 
Yet, the end results of such unchecked executive action will be 
increased economic costs for customers, who will foot the bill for monetary 
damages, litigation expenses, and the costs of complying with the new 
settlement regulations.223 Because tobacco is a product that people are 
viewed as having the choice of using, there may be fewer qualms about 
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requiring the buyer to pay a little extra, particularly if some of those buyers 
will likely later incur high costs to the state taxpayers as a result of tobacco-
related illnesses. But this argument is inapplicable to pharmaceutical 
litigation, where consumers may have no alternative to taking already costly 
medication. 
This distinction between tobacco and the pharmaceutical industries 
illustrates an important point in thinking about regulatory settlements. The 
constitutionality of such regulation has—and continues to be224—criticized 
at great length in the context of the tobacco MSA.225 By contrast, criticism 
of the Vioxx and Bextra settlements (at least in terms of constitutionality) 
has been less vociferous.226 Theoretically, this might be due to the 
enormous size and scope of the tobacco MSA—a settlement that managed 
to reshape an entire area of commerce.227 It may also be on account of what 
the Supreme Court has recognized as the unique cultural place of tobacco 
within American society.228 Yet, the Vioxx and Bextra settlements 
demonstrate a willingness by state AGs to capitalize on the promise of the 
tobacco MSA by expanding these kinds of broad, multistate settlements into 
new areas. Even assuming the legitimacy of the MSA, the dangers 
presented by such regulation through settlement, combined with 
unaddressed constitutional issues, illustrate the need for congressional 
control. 
IV. BUILDING A NUANCED ROLE FOR STATE AGS INTO OUR 
FEDERAL FRAMEWORK 
Ultimately, the goal should be to integrate the state AGs into the 
existing federal regulatory structure, rather than completely marginalize 
their power. It would be foolish to say that the AGs’ success in reaping 
rewards for their state, even in the face of legislative and agency foot-
dragging,229 should be completely overlooked. Yet, as a free-floating entity 
targeting corporate actors based on public relations or political bias, it 
seems clear that the state AGs may do more harm than good. One solution 
to the problem might be to respond to the growing power of the state 
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executive by encouraging legislatures to constrict the power of the AG’s 
office. While such measures might ultimately restrict unfair regulatory 
litigation, such proposals would fail to capitalize on the potential of having 
a nationally engaged state AG’s office. 
Instead, Congress should address the issue of state enforcement power 
by means of explicit grants of authority within federal law. This kind of 
integrated approach would provide a layer of oversight to inactive federal 
regulatory agencies, while simultaneously placing limitations on the most 
egregious examples of overreaching by the states through the separation of 
powers doctrine. An appropriate amendment to the FDCA and other 
relevant acts, clearly delineating the extent to which the state AGs may 
pursue enforcement actions under federal law, would eliminate the need for 
the terms included in the Vioxx and Bextra settlements. At the same time, 
Congress can reap the benefits of an external check on lackadaisical 
agencies and negligent manufacturers, while also prescribing limitations to 
avoid potential policy issues previously described. As discussed earlier, 
such explicit grants of authority already exist in a vast number of federal 
statutes.230 Expanding these grants into new areas of regulatory law would 
eliminate the horizontal and vertical separation of powers issues, described 
in Part II of this note, by requiring the federal legislature to devote their full 
and measured policy judgments in defining the realm of state enforcement 
authority. Such a judgment would also enable Congress to impose 
reasonable limits on the state AGs’ role, including requiring notice of 
actions to the appropriate agency and potentially placing conditions on the 
use of contingency fee arrangements. 
Of course, such action will not remedy all the issues inherent with 
litigation by regulation. But it does place the issue before Congress to 
review and render its best judgment on how to balance the good and bad of 
such litigation. An appropriate middle ground could serve to maximize the 
efficiency of regulation, with a minimal impact on business. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of regulation by settlement, a regulatory scheme with 
potentially drastic implications is crafted away from federal agencies or 
state legislatures.231 In many circumstances, there may well be no need to 
involve such additional parties. There are times, however, when the 
federalist structure of our government and the policy concerns described in 
Part III of this note may demand the involvement of others—federal 
regulators or the elected branches. 
While addressed here primarily in the context of public health concerns, 
the potential scope of settlement-driven regulation is limited only by the 
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willingness of courts to bless such agreements. The templates of Vioxx and 
Bextra, and by proxy the Tobacco MSA, could well expand across a wide 
range of industries—from environmental offenders to the continuously 
developing markets of the internet. Most recently, the issue has been 
implicated by the national settlement reached between major banks, forty-
nine state AGs, and the federal government over the home mortgage 
crisis.232 This approach allows the states to act as a check against federal 
inaction, while ensuring that state settlements do not give rise to a 
convoluted patchwork of regulation. This kind of integration therefore 
presents the most balanced and desirable outcome. 
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